Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, between March and July 2020, Spanish national and regional authorities made extensive use of soft law mechanisms to fight the spread of the virus and to tackle the consequences of the crisis. Soft law was used either as an instrument in and of itself, or as a justification for hard law instruments, with more than 200 non-binding measures being enacted by the state and by the Autonomous Communities. Spanish courts also used soft law as a tool to interpret existing hard law instruments, Such uses give rise to concerns about the transparency of administrative action and the principle of legal certainty. Moreover, the widespread use of soft law to justify the adoption of binding measures restricting fundamental rights might have consequences for democratic accountability and judicial control of executive action. This article indicates the need to reconsider the current system of constitutional and legal constraints attached to this form of regulation, by introducing some binding procedural rules relating to its adoption and its publication, and by clarifying its legal effects and the mechanism through which it can be enforced by courts.This article considers the role of non-binding legal instruments adopted in Italy against the SARS-CoV-2 virus in the early months of 2020. To verify whether the use of such instruments restricted fundamental and human rights beyond constitutional and legal limits, the article first gives an overview of hard law measures adopted in Italy against the coronavirus. It then focuses on soft law measures, the use of which became significant only in Phase II of Italy's response to COVID-19 and argues that non-binding legal instruments provided the public with instructions on gradually returning to normal life. This contribution contains case studies on the soft law measures adopted in relation to private economic enterprise and freedom of worship. Italian soft law deployed during the COVID-19 epidemic was borne out of coordination between the state and the Regions and as the result of (even informal) dialogue with the relevant stakeholders. Despite some criticism of the soft law measures used, their role in restricting constitutionally granted rights was marginal, because only hard law measures adopted nationally and locally limited personal rights and freedoms in order to contain the pandemic.On 13 March 2020 the Hungarian Government announced the immediate closure of all schools throughout the country to prevent the spread of COVID-19 forcing several hundred thousand children to learn from home, and teachers to ensure their education. The Hungarian Educational Authority hurried to issue recommendations on the use of digital education tools. During the COVID-19 pandemic and the special legal order consequently introduced by the Hungarian Government, Hungary has seen the emergence of such non-binding measures adopted by public entities, complementing governmental action against the pandemic, with the aim of providing guidance to bodies exercising a public service function ("addressees"). These protective measures adopted under the special legal order are deemed to be successful and are largely followed by the addressees. Since soft law has hitherto been neglected by both Hungarian administrative governance and the legal literature, the recent burgeoning of non-binding measures deserves scholarly attention. In this article, we set out to map the specific context of the emergence of domestic soft law and the conditions for its adoption and reception, relying on our case study conducted in respect of the National Educational Authority's recommendations.Greece emerged as the EU's poster child in the fight against COVID-19 during the first few months of the pandemic. In this contribution, we assess Greece's use of soft regulation in its regulatory response to COVID-19. Using "acts of legislative content", which can be broadly conceptualised as softly adopted hard law, the Greek government largely achieved flexibility and simplified adoption procedures without having to resort to soft law per se. The role of soft law was limited - it complemented hard law rather than constituting the primary basis of COVID-19 restrictions - but not completely negligible. Soft law instruments regulated the processing of personal data, and was also pivotal in clarifying the criminal sanctioning of COVID-related rule violations. Greece's success in handling the first wave of the pandemic, while effective, was arguably unfair to asylum seekers who saw their right to apply for asylum curtailed, and their right to freedom of movement restricted when limitations on the rest of the population were lifted. With a second wave of infections currently in full swing, it is imperative to keep scrutinising regulatory responses to ensure that they place the health and dignity of every individual (whoever they might be) at their core and fully respect their fundamental rights.In combating the coronavirus pandemic in Germany, soft law has played an important, albeit not a central, role. Its use basically corresponds with that of "normal circumstances". In accordance with the German constitutional order, almost all substantial decisions are made in a legally binding form. However, these are often prepared through or supplemented by soft law. This article shows that soft law has played an important role in fighting the pandemic and its effects in Germany, although there cannot be any doubt that legally binding forms of regulation have prevailed. At the same time, the current pandemic has shed light on the advantages and effects of soft law in the context of the German legal order.In the coronavirus pandemic that has swept the world, the Finnish Government, like many of its peers, has issued policy measures to combat the virus. Many of these measures have been implemented in law, including measures taken under the Emergency Powers Act, or by ministries and regional and local authorities exercising their legal powers. Selleck mTOR inhibitor However, some governmental policy measures have been implemented using non-binding guidelines and recommendations. Using border travel recommendations as a case study, this article critically evaluates governmental soft law-making. The debacle over the use of soft law to fight the pandemic in Finland revealed fundamental misunderstandings about the processes and circumstances under which instruments conceived as soft law can be issued, as well as a lack of attention to their effects from a fundamental rights perspective.